- Greek law
Legal systems of the ancient Greeks.Each city-state administered its own laws, many of which were laid down in written statutes. The harsh law code of Draco and the more humane one of Solon are two of the most famous. Unlike Roman law, Greek law produced little analytical jurisprudence, though the philosophers examined abstract concepts of justice. Those who sat in judgment based their verdicts less on notions of equity than on the statutes' literal meaning. Both private and criminal procedures began with the summoning of the defendant to the magistrate and the filing of a written complaint. A type of arbitration was available in civil suits. Enforcement of a judgment was generally left to the plaintiff.
* * *legal systems of the ancient Greeks, of which the best known is the law of Athens. Although there never was a system of institutions recognized and observed by the nation as a whole as its legal order, there were a number of basic approaches to legal problems, certain methods used in producing legal effects, and a legal terminology, all shared to varying degrees by the numerous independent states constituting the Hellenic world. It should not be forgotten, however, that such common foundations as there were gave rise to a great variety of individual legal systems differing as to their completeness and elaboration and reflecting the tribal (i.e., Dorian, Ionian, etc.) and historical backgrounds as well as the changing social, economic, political, and intellectual conditions of their respective societies.Greek legal life of the 5th and 4th centuries BC was determined by three dominant factors. One was the existence of a multiplicity of city-states (poleis (polis)), each of which possessed and administered its own set of laws. The second element was the fact that in many, if not most, of the poleis (one certain exception was Sparta) the laws were laid down in written statutes, some of them being elaborate and more or less complete codes setting forth procedural methods and substantive rules for the administration of justice. This was the result of a great movement for legal codification that from the 7th century had swept the Greek world. Solon of Athens (594 BC), who had been preceded in 621 by Draco, is the best known of a number of famous lawgivers, other outstanding ones being Zaleucus of Locri Epizephyrii (south Italy) and Charondas of Cantana; Lycurgus of Sparta is considered legendary. A number of enactments rightly or wrongly attributed to Solon still are known from literary quotations rendering them in a modified form that reflects a legislative reform of 403–402 BC. One of the Draconian laws has been preserved in an Attic inscription giving it in a revised version dating from 409 or 408 BC. The law code of Gortyn, which is itself the revised version of an older code, is the only one that comes close to being fully preserved.The third determining factor for Greek law was the absence of a body of jurisprudence comparable to that of the Romans. Even the Attic orators, for all their practical familiarity with the laws of the city, were mainly interested in presenting arguments suited to persuade the mass juries before whom they had to argue, not in analyzing the legal system with the object of obtaining a deeper insight into its implications. Nor, for that matter, did the philosophers care for the law as it was, their aim being the discovery of abstract standards of justice.The three characteristics outlined here were important influences on the general character of Greek law. The first two of these factors resulted in a rather stiff Positivism. Contrary to views held by scholars until recently, new research has shown that the Athenian dicasts who sat in judgment did not feel free to base their verdicts on vague notions of equity but adhered, at least in theory, to the literal meaning of the written statutes (nomoi (nomos)), which they were bound by a solemn oath to observe. This somewhat narrow clinging to literal interpretation, combined with the absence of any attempt to deal with statutes or legal situations in an analytical manner, led to the result that Greek law never attained the doctrinal refinement of Roman law, notwithstanding the remarkable technical flexibility that characterized it in Hellenistic times.At the present stage of research, the only judicial system sufficiently known to warrant description is that of 4th-century Athens. In the democratic period its justice was administered by magistrates, popular courts (dikastēria (dicastery)), and the Areopagus. Functionaries received the actions and arranged the trials that took place before the courts, with each functionary having a specific jurisdiction: the archon over matters pertaining to family and succession, the “king” (archōn basileus) over religious matters (including murder), the thesmothetai (“determiners of customs”) and others over the rest. A special jurisdiction was that of the polemarchos (literally, “general”) over the metics (resident aliens). The trial competence of the dicasteries rested on the principle, first introduced within certain limits by Solon and made universal after the establishment of full democracy, that the citizenry in its totality should judge the affairs of its members. The dicasts were selected by lot, every citizen over 30 years old being eligible. In rare cases of great political importance, the whole hēliaia (i.e., the popular assembly organized as a court of 6,001 men) was convened. Normally sections of the hēliaia (specifically called dikastēria), composed of 1,501, 1,001, or 501 men in criminal cases and 201 men in civil cases, were charged with the decision.Murder cases were argued before the Areopagus, a body composed of former archons. Probably transformed from an original council of the nobility, it was a relic of the predemocratic period.In the Greek view, the trial served to determine the justification of a claim to seize the defendant's person or belongings or both by way of an enforcement proceeding (praxis). The claim (dikē) might be raised by the plaintiff in pursuance of a private right or as a “public” (dēmosia) dikē for the purpose of obtaining the defendant's punishment. The filing of a public dikē (technically called a graphē) was open to every citizen. Apart from this, the differences between private and criminal procedures were slight.Both private dikai and graphai had to be initiated by summoning the defendant (who might be under arrest) to the magistrate having jurisdiction in the matter and by filing a written complaint with the latter, who would subject it to a preliminary examination (anakrisis). Parties to a civil suit concerning pecuniary affairs were then sent to a public arbitrator (diaitētēs). If one of them refused to accept the award or if the matter was not subject to compulsory arbitration, the case was referred to a dicastery presided over by the magistrate. The dicasts, after listening to the arguments and evidence submitted by the parties, found their decision, which could only be a choice between the two proposals made by the parties, by secret ballot without debate. Their judgment was final between the parties, but the loser might bring a private tort action (dikē pseudomartyriōn) against a witness whose false deposition had influenced the verdict. A victorious plaintiff in a private lawsuit had to enforce the judgment himself by attaching property of the defendant.In distinct contrast with the Greek philosophy of justice, the positive law of ancient Greece had little influence on later developments. Its concepts and methods did, of course, widely determine the legislation and practice of Hellenistic monarchies, and a few institutions of Greek origin, such as the “Rhodian” maritime law of jettison or certain methods of documentation (mostly Hellenistic, to be sure), were adopted by the Romans. Contrary to views held some decades ago, however, the late Roman law, and with it west European legal doctrine, did not undergo any notable degree of Hellenization. Only in the customs of isolated places in Greece itself do some ancient traditions seem to survive; their extent is still a problem for legal historians.
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