collective behaviour


collective behaviour

Introduction

      the kinds of activities engaged in by sizable but loosely organized groups of people. Episodes of collective behaviour tend to be quite spontaneous, resulting from an experience shared by the members of the group that engenders a sense of common interest and identity. The informality of the group's structure is the main source of the frequent unpredictability of collective behaviour.

      Included in collective behaviour are the activities of people (sociology) in crowds, panics, fads, fashions, crazes, publics, cults, and followings as well as more organized phenomena, such as reform and revolutionary social movements. Because it emphasizes groups, the study of collective behaviour is different from the study of individual behaviour, although inquiries into the motivations and attitudes of the individuals in these groupings are often carried out. Collective behaviour resembles organized group behaviour in that it consists of people acting together; but it is more spontaneous—and consequently more volatile and less predictable—than is behaviour in groups that have well-established rules and traditions specifying their purposes, membership, leadership, and method of operation.

      The U.S. sociologist Robert E. Park (Park, Robert E.), who coined the term collective behaviour, defined it as “the behavior of individuals under the influence of an impulse that is common and collective, an impulse, in other words, that is the result of social interaction.” He emphasized that participants in crowds, fads, or other forms of collective behaviour share an attitude or behave alike, not because of an established rule or the force of authority, and not because as individuals they have the same attitudes, but because of a distinctive group process.

      The absence of formal rules by which to distinguish between members and outsiders, to identify leaders, to establish the aims of the collectivity, to set acceptable limits of behaviour for members, and to specify how collective decisions are to be made accounts for the volatility of collective behaviour. The leader of a mob can become the object of the mob's hatred in a matter of minutes; a fashion leader can suddenly become passé.

      Although agreeing that collective behaviour does not generally adhere to everyday rules, some investigators emphasize the emergence of rules and patterns within the collectivity that are related to the surrounding social structure. The U.S. psychologist Ralph H. Turner and the U.S. sociologist Lewis M. Killian define collective behaviour on the basis of “the spontaneous development of norms (norm) and organization which contradict or reinterpret the norms and organization of society.” Somewhat similar is the U.S. sociologist Neil J. Smelser's (Smelser, Neil Joseph) definition: “mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action.” The distinctive belief—which is a generalized conception of events and of the members' relationships to them—supplies the basis for the development of a distinctive and stable organization within the collectivity. But Smelser's definition points attention, in a way that other definitions do not, toward the unique manner in which members perceive reality; without such a view a group of people would not be engaged in collective behaviour.

      The U.S. sociologist Herbert Blumer determined a desire for social change in collective behaviour, as expressed in his definition: “a collective enterprise to establish a new order of life.” This definition, however, excludes many of the temporary escapes from conventional life through revelry and orgies, punitive actions such as lynchings, and panics, which are not oriented to any kind of reconstruction of social life or society. Most students of collective behaviour, however, would not restrict the field so severely.

Elementary forms of collective behaviour
      Regardless of where or how collective behaviour develops, it requires some kind of preparation. In organized groups there are rituals (ritual), such as personal introductions, the toastmaster's humour, and group singing, to facilitate the transition from individual action to group interaction. People may act together efficiently if they have been prepared for a pattern of behaviour such as a fire drill, but the result is organized rather than collective behaviour. Lacking organization, people must first become sensitized to and begin to communicate with one another. These processes of sensitization and communication have been called elementary collective behaviour. Three important elementary forms are milling, rumour, and social unrest.

Milling
      Prior to most instances of collective behaviour there is a period during which people move about in a somewhat agitated but aimless way. Early students of crowd behaviour, struck by the resemblance to the milling of cattle before a stampede, gave this form of human activity its name. Its characteristic physical restlessness can be seen in an audience waiting for a late-starting program to begin or among citizens who have just received word of an assassination attempt. In the former case people scuffle their feet, leave their seats and walk about, and sometimes join spontaneously in rhythmic behaviour, such as foot stamping. In the latter case people discontinue routine activities and talk with neighbours, friends, and strangers. In most situations milling also means looking for clues to others' feelings, such as sweating, nervousness, and changes in tone of voice.

      Human milling has at least four important effects. First, it sensitizes people to one another. In this sense milling focuses people's attention on the collectivity and on a subject or problem. Second, milling tends to produce a common mood among the interacting individuals. Where some might react with sorrow, others with anger, and still others with partisan delight or indifference, milling helps to diffuse a single mood within a group. Third, milling develops a common image or interpretation of the situation. The milling throng decides whether the Western tourist taking pictures of a marketplace in the native quarter of an Asian city is harmless or an affront to native dignity; whether the police in an American city are simply arresting a drunken driver or harassing an oppressed minority. Finally, milling sets in motion the process of redefining the rules that govern behaviour. The milling of an audience is usually the signal that customary rules of courtesy toward performers and speakers are no longer applicable and that different forms of behaviour may be expected.

Rumour
Rumour-creating situations
      Rumour abounds under certain circumstances. The U.S. psychologists Gordon W. Allport (Allport, Gordon W.) and Leo Postman offered the generalization that rumour intensity is high when both the interest in an event and its ambiguity are great. The U.S. sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani agreed, contending that rumour abounds when the demand for news is greater than is the supply provided through institutional channels.

      At least two conditions must be added to interest and ambiguity as prerequisites for rumour. First, rumour abounds when a group of people share the need to act but are reluctant to do so until the situation can be better defined. Second, rumour abounds only when the situation requires that in some essential respect the members of the group act in concert rather than individually.

      There are three major kinds of situations in which these four conditions are commonly met and rumour is rampant. First, in a social order in which information is, or is believed to be, strictly controlled by authorities (censorship), rumour is intense. When control over news is a continuing (rather than temporary) condition, rumour becomes regularized as an essential aspect of daily life. The so-called grapevines created by these conditions are regularly utilized by totalitarian regimes, military organizations, and subordinated ethnic groups, races, and social classes.

      Second, rumour spreads when events threaten the understandings upon which normal life is based. A major disaster or scandal presents such a challenge. Any change in the regular accommodations between potentially conflicting or competing groups in society similarly calls into question routine patterns of conduct. The suggestion that management may enforce factory rules more strictly, for example, or the suggestion that a college faculty may stiffen or relax degree requirements, immediately provokes a siege of rumour.

      Third, rumour springs up when a strong, shared incentive to act is blocked in some way, even by merely the lack of an occasion for action. During states of boredom, rumour capitalizes on minor events, magnifying them into occasions for exciting collective action.

The transmission of rumour
      Rumour spreads most rapidly along preexisting social (social status) networks: among friends, associates, and peers rather than among persons of unequal standing. The messenger who first relates a rumour earns prestige by doing so. Moreover, any specific rumour tends to spread most rapidly when it first enters a group, and to reach persons faster who have responsibilities and interests connected with the event.

      It is frequently assumed—incorrectly—that people transmit rumours only when they believe them and that discrediting a rumour will stop its spread. Other evidence suggests that people pass on rumours whether they believe them or not and that the likelihood of belief increases with their repeated hearing. This latter pattern is understandable if rumour is seen as a seeking, rather than a believing, process, in which every idea, no matter how invalid, provides a way of comprehending a strange or troublesome event. But since the group finds it urgent to reach a common understanding, pressure toward acceptance of a favoured version grows as the rumour process expands. Eventually, there is a sorting out of accounts and an insistence that everyone agree to a consensual account, which then serves as a basis for collective action.

Stages of rumour transmission
      There is evidence that rumour follows a typical course. Evidence suggests that the rumour process eliminates the most improbable and unreliable accounts and achieves a high degree of veracity when (1) there is considerable recirculation of rumour and (2) there is a fairly well-organized grapevine. When rumour is recirculated the opportunity to compare versions with different groups of people acts as a brake on exaggeration and rubs off the idiosyncratic aspects of the story. With an established grapevine, the source of rumours can often be checked, and individuals who are known to have inside information are regularly consulted for verification.

      In both early and late stages, rumour content changes with successive retelling in the direction of the understandable and familiar and in the direction of supporting the actions that the group is starting to take. The former is called assimilation by Allport and Postman and is illustrated by the tendency to make rumour details consistent with prejudice. The latter trend indicates that a group is inclined to support those beliefs that supply justification for some course of action toward which they are already predisposed.

Social unrest
      The general condition of the community in which milling is both frequent and widespread and in which rumour is recurrent is the crucible in which the more highly organized forms of collective behaviour develop. This condition, known as social unrest, can lead to outbursts of violence. The American urban black uprisings of the 1960s were preceded and accompanied by social unrest in the form of a rise in tensions in black communities throughout the country; the Russian Revolution was preceded by several years of constant unrest and turmoil, involving random assassinations, strikes, and riots.

      There are several distinguishing characteristics to social unrest. First, there is a general impairment of collective life routines. People find it difficult to concentrate on their work or even to adhere to rules in playing games. Any occasion to abandon routines is welcomed. Second, people are hyperreactive. The magnitude of the response is out of proportion to the usual meaning of any stimulating incident. A small police provocation elicits a major outcry of police brutality; a trivial success is the occasion for large-scale celebration. Milling and rumour abound because incidents that would normally pass with little notice become occasions for both. Third, social unrest is marked by contagiousness. When restlessness is strictly individual, one person's restlessness merely annoys another. But when restlessness becomes a shared experience, people are highly suggestible (suggestion) to one another. Questioning and exploring alternative courses of action are reduced to a minimum. Fourth, social unrest is not specific with respect to grievances or activities. When there is social unrest in a school, students complain of both restrictions on their behaviour and the lack of clearly defined rules; they find fault both with school administrators and with their fellow students. Finally, social unrest is perhaps the most volatile of collective states. Unlike rumour or milling, it does not remain focused on an issue or problem. Unlike crowd behaviour or fads, it has not yet been channeled into one main direction. Although social unrest may eventually die down without any serious aftermath, it is a condition in which people can be easily aroused.

Major forms of collective behaviour

Responses to disaster
      A disaster-stricken community affords a prototypical situation for collective behaviour. The lives of persons are disrupted indiscriminately by a tornado, flood, or earthquake, and coping with the resulting destruction and disorder is beyond the capacity of conventional institutions. Of perhaps greatest importance, the assumption of a reasonably stable and predictable reality is undermined.

Common misconceptions
      A number of common assumptions about behaviour under stress have been dispelled by research on responses to disaster. First, panic is rare. The quite specific conditions under which panic occurs is described below, but stoic, unbelieving, or even resigned reactions are more common than panic. Second, scapegoating is not the rule. Some investigations have suggested an almost unnatural avoidance of singling out villains and placing blame. Within the disaster community the establishment of solidarity is a concern that dampens scapegoating, at least until the immediate emergency is past. Third, there is much less looting and vandalism than is popularly supposed. Even among persons who converge from outside the community there is more petty pilfering for souvenirs than serious crime. Fourth, initially an altruistic selflessness is more prevalent than self-pity and self-serving activity. Frequently noted are dramatic instances of persons who have suffered injury or property damage themselves devoting their time to helping others in no greater need. Fifth, the disruption of established organizations and customary behaviour does not lead primarily to innovation and the exercise of freedom from old restraints. Instead, people more frequently cling to the familiar and seek reinstatement of the old.

The disaster cycle
      Collective behaviour in disaster follows a characteristic cycle, from first warning to community rehabilitation.

Warning period
      Although individuals read widely different meanings into disaster warnings, the striking feature of this initial stage is the slowness to believe and the reluctance to act upon warnings. People often remain in their houses in spite of imminent flooding and remain on familiar low ground in the face of tidal wave warnings. The surface calm that each person seeks to maintain in the presence of others can lead to collective self-deception and the inhibition of tendencies toward flight.

Impact and stocktaking period
      In disasters such as floods and some hurricanes there is a distinctly long period of impact, which can be separated from a subsequent period of stocktaking or immobility. In earthquakes and explosions, on the other hand, the impact is so brief that the periods can hardly be separated. The combined period of impact and stocktaking is marked initially by a fragmentation of human relations, as each individual is separated from others and from his customary moorings; it is then marked by a resurgence of interpersonal warmth that transcends customary social barriers within the disaster community.

Rescue period
      Just as initial fragmentation is followed by unnatural solidarity, stunned immobility gives way to a frenzy of activity in the rescue stage. Although activity is often inefficient, the task of rescuing persons who are trapped and of getting the injured to first-aid facilities is usually accomplished fairly expeditiously, often before outside help arrives. This is the period in which altruism becomes the norm, and old rivalries and conflicts are suspended. Many business concerns adopt an uneconomic generosity, and some individuals disregard their personal welfare. The imperious demand to “do something” at once creates an urgent demand for leadership. People turn first to established community leaders, and, when they are equal to the demands, such figures as police and fire officials, school principals, and mass-media personages are quickly accepted as leaders. Frequently these public figures are as bewildered and distracted as everyone else in the community and are soon abandoned in the restless search for leadership. The leaders then are found among persons who have the specific skills and tools required for the rescue efforts of the moment. Often these are people who do not normally exercise community leadership.

Rebuilding or “brickbat” period
      The buoyed-up state of the disaster community can last only a short time. Tasks that call for intense effort within a brief time span are completed, and the slow and discouraging work of rebuilding confronts the community. Because the old community cleavages begin to reappear, and because tensions created and repressed during the rescue phase are now released, this period has been called the brickbat stage. The most notable characteristic of this period is the tendency to reinstitute the old community—to rebuild homes on old foundations, to reinstate old forms of organization. In spite of criticism against the ineptitude of established authorities, and in spite of evidence that building locations and methods are vulnerable to the elements, it requires strong leadership to guide the community toward innovation that makes use of what can be learned from the disaster experience.

Collective obsessions
      The various kinds of collective obsession—fads, hysterias, and the like—have three main features in common. (1) The most conspicuous sign is a remarkable increase in the frequency and intensity with which people engage in a specific kind of behaviour or assert a belief. There was an “epidemic” of flying-saucer sightings; children in every residential neighbourhood in the United States played on skateboards; there was a sudden rush to buy Florida land. (2) The behaviour—or the abandon with which it is indulged—is ridiculous, irrational, or evil in the eyes of persons who are not themselves caught up in the obsession. In the case of recreational fads, such as skateboarding, nonfaddists are amazed at the tendency to drop all other activities in order to concentrate on the fad; the hundreds of incidents in which swastikas were daubed on synagogues during a few weeks in 1959 and 1960 in the United States, West Germany, and other countries shocked the sensibilities of a world that remembered the Nazi persecution of the Jews. (3) After it has reached a peak, the behaviour drops off abruptly and is followed by a counterobsession. To engage in the fad behaviour after the fad is over is to be subjected to ridicule; after the speculative land boom declines, there is a mad rush to sell property at whatever price it will bring. The following discussion covers five types of collective obsession: fads, hysterical contagion, deviant epidemic, fashion, and crazes.

Fads
      It is tempting to explain fads on the basis of a single motive such as prestige. Prestige is gained by being among the first and most adept at a skill that everyone else covets. That the skill fails as a source of prestige when it is no longer scarce is an important explanation for the abrupt end of a fad. But motives are complex and varied. The exhilaration of joining a band of devotees in an intense preoccupation and the joy of mastering the novel are not to be discounted.

      An examination of fads in such enterprises as scientific research and recreation sheds light on the fundamental dynamics of all kinds of fads. First, the scientific fad begins with a new idea or a rediscovered idea—though not just any new idea will set off a fad. The new idea must be a “key invention,” one that opens up the possibility for a wide range of minor innovations. Discovery of a potent new drug, for example, is followed by a rush to test the drug in all kinds of situations. Similarly, recreation and style faddists do not merely copy a pattern; they try out a variety of novel uses and variations on the basic pattern. The Hula-Hoop was an ideal fad because each child could develop his own particular variation in spinning the hoop.

      Second, the termination of fads is largely explained by the exhaustion of innovative possibilities. The drug has been tested in all of the apparently relevant settings; children have run out of new ways to twirl the Hula-Hoop.

      Third, the faddish preoccupation means holding in abeyance many routine activities as well as awareness of drawbacks to the fads. So long as the fad is in full force, a sharp ingroup-outgroup sense insulates faddists against these concerns. But once the faddists run out of new variations they begin to be aware of the extent of their neglect of other activities and to consider possible dangers in the fad.

Hysterical contagion (conversion disorder)
      Occasionally waves of fear find expression in a rash of false perceptions and symptoms of physical illness. Girls in an English school fainted in great numbers; women in Mattoon, Ill., reported being anesthetized and assaulted by a mysterious prowler. The best documented case is that of a clothing factory that had to be closed down and fumigated because of reports of toxic insect bites—reports that could not subsequently be substantiated. The U.S. sociologist Alan C. Kerckhoff and the U.S. psychologist Kurt W. Back found that the crisis came after a period during which the women employees had performed unusual amounts of overtime work. The women who became ill from the mysterious insect bites had generally worked more overtime than others and had serious family responsibilities that they could not fulfill because of job demands. Afraid to refuse overtime work lest their job prospects be damaged, yet increasingly upset over neglect of family responsibilities, they found themselves in a conflict from which they could not extricate themselves. Illness from an insect bite provided an excuse to leave work for a day or two. The epidemic continued for about 11 days. It began immediately after a large shipment of foreign cloth had arrived, rendering plausible the assumption that some strange new insect had been introduced to the plant. The first women “bitten” were social isolates, lacking normal social defenses and controls. A rapid spread then took place among women who belonged to intimate cliques, in accord with the theory that social diffusion occurs most readily along well-established lines of social interaction. In the final stage the illness spread to others, irrespective of friendship ties or isolation.

Deviant epidemics
      Obsessive behaviour also is observed within deviant groups in society. After Edward G. Robinson starred in the motion picture Little Caesar (1932), a rash of undersized juvenile delinquents aped his manner. In 1959 and 1960 there was a rash of incidents in which synagogues were desecrated, usually by painting Nazi swastikas on them, and anti-Semitic (anti-Semitism) slogans were painted in public places. In the United States the epidemic began the day after Christmas and continued for nine weeks, encompassing 600 reported incidents. Incidents reached a peak in the third week, with the cycle in small communities lagging a little behind the large cities. In the early and late weeks Jewish synagogues, houses, and other specifically Jewish properties were the main targets. During the middle three weeks anti-Semitic symbols were often placed elsewhere, leading investigators to infer that during the peak of the epidemic many participants were drawn in who were less preoccupied with anti-Semitism than were those who initiated the incidents. Only a minority of the perpetrators were identified and arrested, but these were principally adolescent boys who worked together in small unorganized and heterogeneous groups. Some were strongly anti-Semitic in their attitudes, while others were no more hostile toward Jews than they were toward many other groups or aspects of society.

      In this kind of episode socially disapproved feelings are given vent following an initial incident. Beginning with persons who have been holding back a specific feeling for some time, the epidemic builds up until persons with other types of suppressed feelings join in. As the epidemic recedes, these secondary participants drop out first.

      Fashion is much like fads and other collective obsessions, except that it is institutionalized and regularized, becoming continuous rather than sporadic, and partially predictable. Whereas fads often emerge from the lower echelons of society, and thus constitute a potential challenge to the class structure of society, fashion generally flows from the higher levels to the lower levels, providing a continuous verification of class differences. Continuous change is essential if the higher classes are to maintain their distinctiveness after copies of their clothing styles appear at lower levels. Fashions tend to change cyclically within limits set by the stabler culture.

Crazes
      Another term frequently used to characterize collective obsessions is craze. The term is not analytically separate from “fad” and “fashion,” but it does carry somewhat different connotations. Frequently it refers to a collective focus on important figures in the entertainment or sports world—Rudolph Valentino, Frank Sinatra, James Dean, the Beatles, Michael Jackson, and Pelé to name a few. Fans idolize these personalities, relish and mimic real or imaginary details of their lives, and often form clubs or societies to share their fascination. In many instances crazes suffer the same fate as fads—they die abruptly. In some cases, however, figures such as Sinatra and the Beatles outlast the craze and endure as public figures.

      The term craze also has a special connotation in the financial world. There crazes develop when the value of land, stock, or other merchandise is driven well above its intrinsic value by speculation, creating a boom. Such crazes are mainly modern phenomenon, since they require that there be surplus wealth and a flexible and storable medium of exchange. They represent the escalation of a buoyant confidence in the economic future that goes far beyond realistic limits. Financial crazes normally occur after a period of economic expansion and are associated with what seems to be the sudden emergence of a new area of opportunity. The postwar opening up of Spanish New World colonies to British trade was the occasion for the famous 18th-century South Sea Bubble. Combined with craze optimism is the fear of lost opportunity—that is, that the supply of land (or whatever) is not inexhaustible and that only those who buy early will benefit from the initial low prices. The famous crazes have generally received the stamp of authenticity from respected figures who themselves invested and endorsed the enterprise. No less a person than the king of England lost money when the South Sea Bubble burst. Speculative crazes in modern times evolve particularly out of stock exchange activities, although government controls have somewhat curtailed their volatility.

Crowds
      A thin line separates crowd activities from collective obsessions. The crowd is, first, more concentrated in time and space. Thus a race riot, a lynching, or an orgy is limited to a few days or hours and occurs chiefly within an area ranging from a city square or a stadium to a section of a metropolitan area. Second, a concern of the majority of the crowd (many participants do not always share the concern) is a collaborative goal rather than parallel individual goals. The “june bug obsession” cited earlier, in which dozens of women went home from work because of imaginary insect bites, could have turned into a crowd action if the women had banded together to demand a change in working conditions or to conduct a ceremony to exorcise the evil. Third, because the goal is collaborative, there is more division of labour and cooperative activity in a crowd than in collective obsessions. Finally, a major concern of a crowd is with some improvement or social change expected as a result of its activity. Labour rioters expect management to be more compliant after the riot; participants in a massive religious revival expect life in the community to be somehow better as a result.

      The crucial step in developing crowd behaviour is the formation of a common mood directed toward a recognized object of attention. In a typical riot situation a routine police arrest or a fistfight between individuals from opposing groups focuses attention. Milling and rumour then establish a mood of indignation and hostility toward an identified enemy or enemies. In a collective religious experience there is usually an amazing event that rivets attention. Through elementary collective behaviour the mood is defined as religious awe and gratitude toward the supernatural and its agents.

      As the mood and object become established, either an “active” crowd or an “expressive” crowd is formed. The active crowd is usually aggressive, such as a violent mob, though occasionally it acts to propel members into heroic accomplishments. The expressive crowd has also been called the dancing crowd because its manifestations are dancing, singing, and other forms of emotional expression.

Active crowds
      The active crowd identifies an object or group of objects outside itself and proceeds to act directly upon it or them. It will brook no delay or interference, no discussion of the desirability of acting, and no dissent from its course of action. Because of the high pitch of crowd interaction, subtle and indirect courses of action cannot win crowd support, though members are highly suggestible to all proposals and examples for action in keeping with the mood and the object. The stage of transformation from shared mood to shared action constitutes the beginning of the true crowd or mob.

      The crucial feature of this stage is overcoming the barriers to such behaviour as the destruction of property or violence toward persons—actions against which most people have strongly ingrained inhibitions (inhibition). At least four aspects of the way crowd members feel about the situation make this possible. First, there is a sense of an exceptional situation in which a special moral code applies. The crowd merely carries further the justification for a special code of ethics incorporated in the slogan “You have to fight fire with fire!” Second, there is a sense of power in the crowd, with its apparent determination and uniform will, that overcomes the individual's doubts concerning his own ability to carry out a momentous task successfully. Third, there is a sense of impunity, of safety from personal injury and punishment so long as the individual is on the side of the crowd. And finally, there is a sense of inevitability—that the crowd aim will be accomplished regardless of the doubts and opposition of individuals.

      Once the crowd breaks through the barrier of conventional restraints there is typically a “Roman holiday” period during which all restraint appears to be dropped. To the outsider, people seem to have gone mad. Rage is entirely uninhibited. But at the same time an atmosphere of intense enjoyment and release is evident. There is laughing and cheering as the violence and destruction become part of a tremendous carnival.

      Under cover of the Roman holiday, people pursue many different interests. Looting for personal gain is infrequent in the early stages of rioting. The leading agents in bringing the mob into being are too preoccupied with their indignation for this. But once the general attack is under way, looting for gain, vandalism for fun, and attacks on specific objects to pay off old grudges become prevalent. In Russian and Polish pogroms of the 19th and early 20th centuries, peasants came with their carts to loot Jewish property after they heard that the pogrom was under way. Lynchings in the southern United States in the early part of the 20th century were frequently followed by general forays on black neighbourhoods.

      The active crowd normally ends with a tapering-off period, which is sometimes preceded by a stage of siege. In riots of limited scale in which no massive police or military forces are used, the peak day is followed by a few more days of successively smaller numbers of widely scattered encounters. Often the last incidents are in areas not previously hit by rioting. There seems to be some internal mechanism limiting the duration of crowd behaviour, though whether it is fatigue, catharsis, or reassertion of ingrained standards of behaviour is uncertain. In serious riots, however, the police and other armed forces are brought into action long before the riot declines on its own. When police power is applied with only enough force to ensure a standoff between rioters and authorities, there is a period—usually ranging from one to three or four days—of siege. The mood of buoyancy gives way to a mood of dogged persistence. Rioters are more cautious and deliberate in what they do. The desire to have the riot over grows among the participants and in the community, but there is reluctance to give up the fight until concessions have been won.

      A crowd develops only when a necessary sequence of events occurs and when conditions conducive to crowd development are present. There are at least six such conditions of importance. The first is a deep frustration that is shared by an important segment of the population and that has been festering for a considerable period of time. The frustration is especially poignant when widening intergroup contacts make the frustrated segment more vitally aware of its disadvantages, when its members have been encouraged by education or a public policy statement to aspire to relatively unattainable objectives, and when a period of steadily improving conditions is suddenly interrupted. Second is the presence of deep intergroup cleavages in society. A crowd must have not only a grievance but also an oppressor whom it can blame for its condition. Third is some contradiction in the value system of society, so that there is support both for the social arrangements that the group finds frustrating and for its demands for change. Fourth is a failure of communication, so that grievances can no longer be presented to the appropriate authorities with confidence that they will be given some consideration. Fifth is some failure in the system of control. Mobs often catch police unprepared. In many instances the police, by virtue of their class or ethnic identity, are in sympathy with mobs and unwilling to enforce order. Sixth are experiences leading people to hope that conditions will be improved as a result of violent or disruptive action. Many riots have the support of a well-developed ideology, or they follow occasions when demonstrations and other less extreme tactics have won gains. Among the reasons that mob actions do not soon recur in a given location are that the forces of order are usually strengthened, the hope of great gain is dampened, and channels of communication are often improved after a mob action.

Expressive crowds
      Not all crowds act. In some crowds the participants are largely preoccupied with themselves or with one another, and with participation in a common experience. Beginning as early as the 7th century in Europe, and continuing throughout the Middle Ages, there were reported epidemics in which groups of people were caught up in a frenzy of dancing (dance) that continued until they dropped. Later a collective frenzy of dancing, singing, and shouting became a regular feature of frontier revivals (revivalism) in 19th-century America. Crowds that exceeded conventional limits of revelry have been common in many historical eras. In San Francisco in 1945, license for public violation of sexual mores characterized the day of celebration at the end of the war with Japan.

      Expressive crowds may be secular or religious. What distinguishes them is that the production of a shared subjective experience is the crowd's measure of its accomplishment, rather than any action upon objects outside the crowd. One interpretation is that the same determinants of social unrest and frustration may give rise to both the expressive crowd and the active crowd, but the expressive crowd fails to identify an object toward which to act; hence members must release accumulated tension through motions and gestures expressing emotion. According to this view an expressive crowd can fairly quickly metamorphose into an active crowd if an object becomes apparent to them. Another interpretation sees the expressive crowd as equally equipped with an object, but with an object that must be acted upon symbolically rather than directly. Thus, one crowd engages in a wild dance to exorcise evil spirits, whereas another seeks to destroy buildings associated with the “establishment” that it blames for many ills.

      The expressive crowd may serve best those types of frustrations requiring revitalization of the individual and group rather than direct modification of external circumstances. Expressive crowds may be especially frequent in periods of frustration and boredom over the predictability and routinization of life, from lack of a sense of meaning and importance in the daily round of life, and from a sense of interpersonal isolation in spite of the physical closeness of others.

Panic
      The word panic is often applied to a strictly individual, maladaptive reaction of flight, immobility, or disorganization stemming from intense fear. For example, a student “panics” during an examination and is unable to call upon his knowledge in answering questions, or a disaster victim in a situation of mild danger panics and flees into much greater danger. Individual panic frequently occurs as a unique individual response without triggering a similar reaction in others.

      Panic as collective behaviour, however, is shared behaviour. When an entire military unit breaks into disorderly flight, a group pattern of orderly behaviour is replaced by a group pattern of panic.

      There are a number of distinguishing features to collective panic, four of which are noted here. First, several persons in social contact with one another simultaneously exhibit intense fear and either flee (or demonstrate disorganization leading toward flight) or remain immobile. Second, each individual's fear and his evaluation of the danger are augmented by the signals he receives from others. Third, flight is indicated as the only conceivable course of action by the signals each is receiving from others. Fourth, the usual rules according to which individuals adjust their behaviour so as not to work at cross-purposes are nullified. In the more dramatic instances of collective panic, people trample one another in vain efforts to reach safety.

      Four types of causes for collective panic are generally recognized. First, collective panic usually occurs in the kind of situation that arouses fear in any individual. Hence the psychological causes for individual panic are also the fundamental causes for collective panic.

      A second cause of panic is the special character of the situation in which people find themselves. Students of responses to disaster observe that collective panic occurs only when people perceive a danger that is both immediate and severe, when they know of only a very limited number of escape routes from the danger, and when they believe those routes are being closed off so that the time for escape is extremely limited. The requirement that all three conditions be present underlines the observation that intense fear in situations from which there is apparently no escape elicits no collective panic and little individual panic.

      Psychologists have suggested that collective panic be viewed as part of a broad class of individualistic crowds. Individualistic crowds include such phenomena as the crush and breakdown of order that sometimes occur at a bargain sale, or the transformation of an orderly ticket-window queue into a shoving and pushing crowd. All the usual mechanisms of crowd behaviour are in operation, but, in contrast to the lynch mob or race riot, the situation encourages the intensified pursuit of individual rather than collective goals.

      The situational explanation is not complete by itself, however, as indicated by such occasions as the sinking of the ocean liner Titanic with great loss of life but without panic. The ship was visibly sinking, and it was known that there were too few lifeboats for all the passengers, and yet men were frequently reluctant to board the lifeboats until all women and children on board had first been rescued. Hence the third set of causes is the interstimulation of elementary crowd behaviour, the milling, rumour, and social unrest, through which the group forms a collective view of the situation and of the appropriate behaviour. It is difficult to find any logical explanation for the difference in behaviour between the passengers on the Titanic and passengers who have panicked in other maritime disasters, except that a norm of gentility and heroism came to dominate the collective definition through these elementary processes.

      Since the most dramatic feature of panic behaviour is every individual's disregard for his fellows' lives, many students believe that the fourth set of causes lies in the quality of every individual's relations with his fellows. The U.S. sociologists Kurt Lang and Gladys E. Lang view panic as the end point in a process of demoralization in which behaviour becomes privatized and there is a general retreat from the pursuit of group goals.

Publics and masses
      Crowd behaviour and such related forms as fads and panics are often contrasted with “publics,” in which more of an attitude of deliberation prevails. The most important distinction between crowds and publics is that people in the public recognize that there is a division of opinion (public opinion) about an issue and are prepared to interact with a recognition and tolerance of difference. Blumer defines the public as “a group of people who (a) are confronted by an issue, (b) are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and (c) engage in discussion over the issue.” Another important difference is that the product of interaction in the public is public opinion, rather than the collective action or experience of collective ecstasy that eventuates from active and expressive crowds.

      Publics are common in societies where public officials and institutional leaders are thought to be responsive to indications of public opinion. When this condition does not prevail, collective behaviour does not usually crystallize beyond the elementary forms, stopping with the establishment of a rumour grapevine. When disillusionment over official response to public opinion reaches a high pitch, publics either do not form or turn quickly into crowds that take direct action.

      The public and crowd should be distinguished from the “mass.” Members of a mass exhibit similar behaviour, simultaneously, but with a minimum of interaction. Masses include a wide range of groups. They include, for instance, people simultaneously reading the newspaper advertisement for a department store sale and simultaneously converging on the store with similar objects in mind; but masses also involve people converging in a disaster or a gold rush or a mass migration. In the public and the crowd, social interaction plays a large part in accounting for common definitions of an issue and similar views about how to deal with a problem. But in a mass a great many people react similarly to a common stimulus just because they have common attitudes and motivations. Election behaviour is often closer to the mass than to the public, when taboos on discussing controversial topics lead each person to make up his mind privately on the basis of what he gleans from the mass media of communication.

Theories of collective behaviour
      Because much collective behaviour is dramatic, unpredictable, and frightening, the early theories and many contemporary popular views are more evaluative than analytic. The French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon identified the crowd and revolutionary movements with the excesses of the French Revolution; the U.S. psychologist Boris Sidis was impressed with the resemblance of crowd behaviour to mental disorder. Many of these early theories depicted collective behaviour as an atavism, in which the evolutionary accomplishments of civilization were stripped away and human behaviour returned to an earlier stage of development. Freud (Freud, Sigmund) retained this emphasis in viewing crowd behaviour and many other forms of collective behaviour as regressions to an earlier stage of childhood development; he explained, for example, the slavish identification that followers have for leaders on the basis of such regression.

      More sophisticated recent efforts to treat collective behaviour as a pathological manifestation employ social disorganization as an explanatory approach. From this point of view collective behaviour erupts as an unpleasant symptom of frustration and malaise stemming from cultural conflict, organizational failure, and other social malfunctions. The distinctive feature of this approach is a reluctance to take seriously the manifest content of collective behaviour. Neither the search for enjoyment in a recreational fad, the search for spiritual meaning in a religious sect, nor the demand for equal opportunity in an interest-group movement is accepted at face value.

      An opposite evaluation of many forms of collective behaviour has become part of the analytic perspective in revolutionary approaches to society. From the revolutionist's point of view, much collective behaviour is a release of creative impulses from the repressive effects of established social orders. Revolutionary theorists such as Frantz Fanon (Fanon, Frantz) depict traditional social arrangements as destructive of human spontaneity, and various forms of crowd and revolutionary movements as man's creative self-assertion bursting its social shackles.

Individual motivation theories
      Among the analytic theories that seek to eschew evaluation, the most popular ones stress individual motivation in accounting for collective behaviour. Frustration and lack of firm social anchorage are the two most widely used explanations for individual participation in collective behaviour of all kinds. In the psychiatric tradition, frustration heightens suggestibility, generates fantasy, brings about regressions and fixations, and intensifies drives toward wish fulfillment so that normal inhibitions are overcome. Since most forms of collective behaviour promote thoughts that are otherwise difficult to account for and that breech behavioral inhibitions, this is often a fruitful source of explanation.

      In the sociological tradition of Émile Durkheim (Durkheim, Émile), absence of firm integration into social groups leaves the individual open to deviant ideas and susceptible to the vital sense of solidarity that comes from participation in spontaneous groupings. Drawing upon both the psychiatric and the sociological traditions, Erich Fromm (Fromm, Erich) attributed the appeal of mass movements and crowds to the gratifying escape they offer from the sense of personal isolation and powerlessness that people experience in the vast bureaucracies of modern life. Extending Karl Marx's (Marxism) theory of modern man's alienation from his work, many contemporary students attribute faddism, crowds, movements of the spirit, and interest-group and revolutionary movements to a wide-ranging alienation from family, community, and country, as well as from work.

      According to the approach suggested by the U.S. political scientist Hadley Cantril, participation in vital collectivities supplies a sense of meaning through group affirmation and action and raises the member's estimate of his social status, both of which are important needs often frustrated in modern society. Eric Hoffer (Hoffer, Eric), a U.S. philosopher, attributed a leading role in collective behaviour to “true believers,” who overcome their own personal doubts and conflicts by the creation of intolerant and unanimous groups about them.

Interaction theories
      Sociologists and social psychologists, without denying the place of individual motivation in any complete explanation for collective behaviour, have more often stressed a distinctive quality or intensity of social interaction. The U.S. sociologist Ernest Burgess (Burgess, Ernest Watson), along with Park (Park, Robert E.), associates collective behaviour with “circular reaction,” a type of interaction in which each person reacts by repeating (imitation) the action or mirroring the sentiment of another person, thereby intensifying the action or sentiment in the originator. Blumer adds a subtlety to this theory by sharply distinguishing circular reaction from “interpretative interaction,” in which the individual first interprets another's action and then makes a response usually different from the stimulus action. Another stream of thought has stressed difference of intensity rather than kind of interaction. Following the lead of the French social scientist Gabriel Tarde and the French psychologist Alfred Binet, many investigators have looked for clues that normal imitative tendencies and suggestibility may be intensified in collective behaviour. An important approach is based on the U.S. psychologist Floyd H. Allport's criticism of Le Bon (Le Bon, Gustave) and William McDougall (McDougall, William), a British-born U.S. psychologist, for their concept of “group mind,” and for their apparent assumption that collective behaviour makes people do things to which they are not predisposed. Allport insisted instead that collective behaviour involves merely a group of people doing what they previously wanted to do but for which they lacked the occasion and the support of like-minded associates.

      These interaction theories have been labeled contagion and convergence theories, respectively—the former stressing the contagious spread of mood and behaviour; the latter stressing the convergence of a large number of people with similar predispositions. Both have sought to explain why a group of people feel and act (1) unanimously, (2) intensely, and (3) differently from the manner in which they customarily act. Other interaction theorists have challenged the assumption of unanimity, proposing that in most kinds of collective behaviour a single mood and course of action is established with such force and intolerance that the many who privately dissent are silenced, creating an illusion of unanimity. Rather than contagion, it is an emergent norm or rule that governs external appearances and, to a lesser extent, internal convictions in collective behaviour.

      Freud (Freud, Sigmund), too, stressed a distinctive pattern of interaction in collective behaviour. The key to these groupings is the desire to possess a beloved leader. Because the leader is unattainable, and because his attentions must be shared among many followers, a relation of identification is expressed in the demand for uniformity that the followers insistently impose on each other, according to the example of the leader.

      A final set of theories stresses characteristics of social organization that generate collective behaviour. Collective behaviour is commonly seen by sociologists as a normal accompaniment and medium for social change, relatively absent in periods of social stability. With the more or less continuous shifts of values in any society, emerging values are first given group expression in collective behaviour; efforts to revitalize declining values also bring forth collective behaviour. Again, the constant readjustments in the power of different population segments are implemented and resisted through collective behaviour. Because it is a means of communication, and because it is always characterized by novel or intensified control over individuals, collective behaviour also arises to bypass blockages in communication and to install an emergent order when formal or informal regulation of behaviour is inadequate.

      The most comprehensive theory specifying necessary conditions for the development of most major forms of collective behaviour was advanced by Smelser (Smelser, Neil Joseph). He noted six conditions that must be present: (1) the social structure must be peculiarly conducive to the collective behaviour in question; (2) a group of people must experience strain; (3) a distinctive type of belief must be present to interpret the situation; (4) there must be a precipitating event; (5) the group of people must be mobilized for action on the basis of the belief; and (6) there must be an appropriate interaction between the mobilized group and agencies of social control. The detail for each condition varies with the type of collective behaviour.

The results of collective behaviour

The variety of effects
Short-term effects
      The most notable immediate effect of all kinds of collective behaviour is to alter the salience of various problems, issues, and groups in public awareness. Popular concern about disarmament grew large as “Ban-the-Bomb” demonstrations proliferated during the late 1950s and early 1960s; then public interest waned as demonstrations became infrequent or ceased. A fad calls attention to recreational needs; the circumstances surrounding a panic monopolize public attention. Second, all forms of collective behaviour contribute to polarizations, forcing people to take sides on issues and eliminating the middle ground. Often a three-sided conflict develops among the two polarized groups and mediators who wish to de-emphasize divisive issues altogether. Third, every instance of collective behaviour either alters or strengthens the makeup of group and community leadership. The swings of fashion discredit some clothes designers and boost others to prominence. A riot or a wildcat strike usually reveals the inability of established leaders to control their members and produces emergent leaders from among the spokesmen acceptable to members.

Contingencies
      How the immediate effects of collective behaviour are translated into long-term consequences depends upon several contingencies, of which four merit attention. First, the nature of the response by authorities affects the immediate course of the collective behaviour. Some evidence suggests that alarmed and repressive reactions strengthen polarization, that moderate reactions strengthen the mediation viewpoint, and that inaction or ineffectual action facilitates efforts toward usurpation of authority.

      Second, the response of authorities affects public definitions of the meaning of the collective behaviour. Publics have variously defined particular fads as harmless diversions, threats to authority and order, threats to health and well-being, visitations of the Holy Spirit, and possession by the devil, treating them quite differently in consequence. Lynchings are vigilante actions, or they are criminal subversions of justice. Riots can be viewed as mass criminality or as social protest. Social movements are defined as respectable, or as peculiar but harmless, or as dangerous and revolutionary, evoking polite support, embarrassed avoidance, or active repression, respectively.

      A third contingency affecting the aftermath of collective behaviour concerns the nature and strategy of the counter-movements or counterfads that arise. When the counter-movement arises, acquires a bitter and reactionary tone, and becomes a backlash, polarization and heightened disorder often lead to demands for order at any cost, at the expense of any amelioration that might otherwise have occurred. But backlash is often self-discrediting as “extremism,” and over the long run it sometimes pushes many people onto the side of amelioration. Countermovements that avoid the backlash pattern typically try to undermine the group they oppose by taking some of the latter's aims as their own, thereby helping to effect reforms sought in the initial protest.

      Finally, the effect of collective behaviour depends upon the ubiquitous process of conventionalization. In a spontaneous fad or mob action, participants usually copy the pattern of earlier incidents with which they are familiar, so that separate incidents in a wave of collective behaviour exhibit a similarity indicating the development of customary ways of rioting, or playing at a fad, and possibly even of panicking. When incidents are repeated, a gradual accommodation between participants in collective behaviour and the authorities becomes routinized. Once the behaviour is conventionalized in this fashion, there are increasing efforts to create and use the conventionalized form of collective behaviour for private and public aims. Much advertising seeks to create fads in conventionalized ways. Political rallies, sports rallies, and some of the ceremonies of established religious organizations seek to conventionalize the enthusiasm and sense of solidarity of expressive crowds. Social movements rapidly acquire stable organizations, sects become denominations, political movements become political parties or are absorbed into parties, and humanitarian movements become stabilized as associations to promote some form of human betterment. Conventionalization extends the influence of orienting ideas, but it also ensures compromise and abandonment of the most disruptive and controversial features of the initial behaviour.

Long-term effects
      In the long run it is difficult to be sure whether a particular type of collective behaviour actually makes a difference or whether it is merely a shadow cast by passing events. Scattered collective behaviour is endemic in every society. But when there is widespread discontent, collective behaviour soon becomes a prominent feature of group life. When there are no exciting new ideas—such as the liberal humanitarian vision of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Socialist idea of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the nationalist mystique of the 20th century—collective behaviour consists principally of expressive behaviour, panics, and unfocused disruption or intergroup vengeance such as pogroms. This kind of collective behaviour probably contributes little to change. But when there is a new perspective to give meaning to discontent, many forms of collective behaviour appear to become agents of change. Even a recreational fad becomes a form of self-assertion for a rising class or age group. Le Bon (Le Bon, Gustave) suggested that in a period of widespread discontent crowd action serves to destroy an old order in preparation for a new one. Social (social structure) movements help to build the new order.

      One view holds that collective behaviour supplies a testing ground on which new ideas are tried out for general acceptability and on which groups test their strength against forces of resistance. The outcome of this testing is sometimes change and sometimes public demonstration that the old order is still viable. This view suggests that collective behaviour has as great a function to play in maintaining social stability as in implementing social change.

Attempts at control
      Attempts to control collective behaviour vary according to whether change or stability is sought. Advocates of change seek to control countermovements and backlash crowds, as well as those expressive crowds and fads that anesthetize people to their grievances, whereas advocates of stability seek to control crowds and movements that undermine public order or threaten revolution. Advocates of both change and stability likewise make use of collective behaviour in achieving their aims. The volatile and unpredictable nature of all collective behaviour renders manipulation and control highly problematic, however, and masters of control, such as the French revolutionary Robespierre, have often been victims of the followers they once manipulated.

      The most sensitive and difficult control problem occurs at the moment of the first precipitating incident and during the stage of transformation in an active crowd. A show of weakness—or maybe even unnecessary repression—will escalate the crowd into the Roman-holiday stage. It is essential to identify spokesmen who command a hearing with the crowd—often not the established group leaders—and open serious negotiations with them. Poorly arranged negotiating sessions before television cameras are easily turned into occasions for incitement of the crowd. If the provocations of excessive policing are avoided and one or two dramatic concessions of great symbolic importance made, a cooling-off period may be secured in which more comprehensive measures to relieve tensions in the situation can be undertaken.

      Once collective behaviour is fully escalated there is seldom any control technique available except massive suppression, and some experts believe that crowd behaviour will spring up again if crushed before it has substantially run its course. Interference with an expressive crowd, and even with many fads and instances of hysterical contagion, often turns it into a hostile, active one. As the intensity of feeling begins to decline, the time is then ripe to quicken the end of crowd behaviour by intensifying negotiations with spokesmen respected by the crowd.

Lewis M. Killian Ralph H. Turner Neil J. Smelser

Additional Reading

Theoretical and general studies
Theories of collective behaviour are introduced in Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements (1941, reprinted 1973); Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1922, reissued 1975; originally published in German, 1921); William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (1968); Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (1951, reissued 1980); Richard T. Lapiere, Collective Behavior (1938); and David L. Miller, Introduction to Collective Behavior (1985). See also John C. Brigham, Social Psychology (1986). The major general treatments of the subject include Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior,” in Alfred M. Lee (ed.), Principles of Sociology, 3rd ed. (1969), a classic sociological statement of a widely used approach; Roger Brown, “Mass Phenomena,” in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 2, pp. 833–876 (1954); and Stanley Milgram and Hans Toch, “Collective Behavior: Crowds and Social Movements,” in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed., vol. 4, pp. 507–610 (1968), comprehensive reviews presented by psychologists; Robert R. Evans (ed.), Readings in Collective Behavior, 2nd ed. (1975), a collection of classic journal articles; Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, Collective Dynamics (1961), a standard textbook; Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (1963, reissued 1971), a classic theoretical treatise and text; Ralph H. Turner, “Collective Behavior,” in Robert E.L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology, pp. 382–425 (1964), an analytic statement of the field for the advanced student in sociology; Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, 3rd ed. (1987), a standard textbook; and John Lofland, Protest: Studies of Collective Behavior and Social Movements (1985).

Specialized studies
Elementary collective behaviour is studied in Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (1947, reprinted 1975); Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (1966); and Fredrick Koenig, Rumor in the Marketplace: The Social Psychology of Commercial Hearsay (1985). Responses to disaster are the subject of George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman (eds.), Man and Society in Disaster (1962); Walter Lord, A Night to Remember (1955, reissued 1984); Harry E. Moore, Tornadoes over Texas: A Study of Waco and San Angelo in Disaster (1958); and United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Behavior and Attitudes Under Crisis Conditions: Selected Issues and Findings (1984). For discussion of collective obsessions, see David Caplovitz and Candace Rogers, Swastika 1960: The Epidemic of Anti-Semitic Vandalism in America (1961); John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (1960); Alan C. Kerckhoff and Kurt W. Back, The June Bug: A Study of Hysterical Contagion (1968); and Charles MacKay, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions, 3 vol. (1841, reissued in 1 vol. as Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 1981).

Crowds
E. Louis Backman, Religious Dances in the Christian Church and in Popular Medicine (1952, reprinted 1977; originally published in Swedish, 1945); Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (1969; published also as The History of Violence in America); Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 2nd ed. (1968, reprinted 1984; originally published in French, 1895); Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968); Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching (1933, reprinted 1970); George Rudé, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848, rev. ed. (1981); Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), Changing Conceptions of Crowd Mind and Behavior (1986); and Frank Stagg, E. Glenn Hinson, and Wayne E. Oates, Glossolalia: Tongue Speaking in Biblical, Historical and Psychological Perspective (1967).Ralph H. Turner

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Universalium. 2010.

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