Rose, Sir Michael

▪ 1995

      In January 1994 Lieut. Gen. Sir Michael Rose assumed one of the toughest and most delicate military commands in the world: leading the UN forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within weeks he had won praise from around the world for his ability to combine diplomatic skills with military judgment.

      Rose was born in Quetta, India (now in Pakistan), on Jan. 5, 1940. After studying at the University of Oxford and the Sorbonne, he was commissioned (1964) into the Coldstream Guards. He first saw active service in Aden (now part of Yemen), where the transition from colonial rule to independence (1967) was accompanied by considerable violence. In 1968 Rose joined the fabled Special Air Services (SAS), with whom he conducted a number of undercover operations in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and East Asia. In 1976 he surfaced as a squadron commander in Northern Ireland. Although some British troops were accused of operating a shoot-to-kill policy, Rose acquired a reputation for insisting that all counterterrorist operations had to operate strictly within the law and under political control.

      On April 30, 1980, six Arab terrorists occupied the Iranian embassy in London, seizing 27 hostages. Six days later, after the murder of one hostage and the breakdown of negotiations to secure the release of the rest, Rose led a rescue team of SAS officers. They abseiled into the embassy, freed all the remaining hostages, and killed five terrorists. The assault, shown live on television, greatly enhanced the reputation of the SAS in general and Rose in particular.

      Two years later Rose played a prominent role in the recapture of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas from Argentina. He led the operation that regained Mt. Kent, overlooking the capital, and subsequently negotiated the Argentine surrender that ended the war. In 1990 he was appointed director of the Army Staff College, with instructions to modernize its courses and shift its emphasis toward small-scale local wars and counterterrorist operations.

      His appointment as UN commander in Bosnia gave him a chance to use his experience. He quickly became convinced that he did not have enough troops to guarantee keeping the peace. Partly as a result, he sought to talk, rather than fight, his way out of problems. This provoked criticism from some quarters that he was too slow to launch air strikes against Serbian positions.

      Rose repeatedly called for an increase in his 10,000-strong force, especially the 3,700-strong British contingent. He also entered the argument over whether the UN should lift its arms embargo on Bosnia. He said that if the embargo were lifted, his troops would be placed in an impossible position and would have to withdraw. On October 17, the UN announced that Rose would leave Bosnia in January 1995, at the end of his 12-month term. (PETER KELLNER)

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